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Industrial organization and marketing researchers have known for some time that firms who 
sell differentiated products compete not only in prices but in variety as well. For example, more 
than thirty years ago it was argued that ready-to-eat-cereal manufacturers regularly used new 
product introductions as tools to keep potential competitors at bay (Schmalensee 1978). More 
recently, researchers have demonstrated that variety decisions (e.g. line length) can be used as 
competitive weapons and thus should be set in conjunction with profit maximizing prices 
(Draganska & Jain 2005; Draganska, Mazzeo, & Sime 2009). Furthermore, numerous studies 
have shown that consumer welfare can be positively or negatively affected by manufacturer and 
retailer decisions regarding product variety (e.g. Pofahl & Richards 2009; Kim 2004; Hausman 
1994). Despite these findings, empirical work in the area of horizontal merger analysis continues 
to focus primarily on the prediction of post merger price changes and subsequent consumer 
welfare effects. However, it is clear from the literature that firms who internalize competitive 
pressures through agglomeration are likely to affect consumer welfare through new price and 
variety decisions. Thus, empirical work that explores optimal pricing and variety choices within 
the context of horizontal mergers is in order. 
The goal of our research is to gain a better understanding of simultaneous price and variety 
decisions within the context of a horizontal merger. We achieve this goal by simulating 
numerous hypothetical mergers between well-known soft drink companies who likely compete 
in prices and variety. Using data and methods described below, we estimate post-merger price 
and variety changes associated with each merger. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section two we briefly outline merger 
simulation research and show how our study contributes to the existing literature.  Section three 2 
 
contains background information on the carbonated soft drink industry and why it is an 
appropriate category for consideration within our framework.  Next we provide details of our 
modeling approach.  In section five we describe our data and estimation techniques and present 
results and conclusions in section six. 
 
Merger Simulation Research 
    In "Economic Analysis of Differentiated Products Mergers using Real World Data," 
Hausman and Leonard (1997) state: 
Economic analyses of the competitive effects of mergers in differentiated product industries 
typically concentrate on the potential for so-called unilateral effects. Unilateral effects arise 
when the products of the merging parties place significant competitive restraints on each other 
prior to the merger. The merged company may then be able to raise prices post-merger, 
unilaterally, depending on the importance of the pre-merger competitive constraints the merging 
firms hand on each other. 
An analysis of unilateral effects thus seeks to determine whether the removal of the 
competitive constraints the merging firms' products place on each other is likely to lead to higher 
prices after the merger. 
    The analysis of unilateral effects, i.e., post-merger price changes, is still the focus of 
merger simulation to this day. As defined by Hausman and Leonard in 2005, merger simulation 
is "The technique of using a model of consumer demand together with a model of competition to 
predict the price effects of a merger". From Hausman et al's seminal work in 1994 on the beer 
category, various extensions of the literature have been realized. Multiple differentiated product 
categories have been studied such as ready to eat cereal by Nevo(2000), spaghetti sauce by 3 
 
Capps et al (2003), CSD's by Dubé (2005), and coffee by Villas-Boas (2007). Different demand 
specifications have been used such as the AIDS (Werden 1997), Rotterdam (Capps et al 2003), 
Mixed Logit (Villas Boas 2007), and Multiple Discreteness models (Dubé 2005). Furthermore, 
although most studies have assumed a coordinated channel structure some have introduced 
Manufacturer-Stackelberg (Villas Boas 2007) as a competition structure more consistent with 
retailers' behavior in the marketplace. One common theme among all these studies though is the 
goal of ascertaining post-merger price changes, the only unilateral effect taken into 
consideration. 
    Naturally, merger simulation has come to be recognized as a useful tool in the analysis of 
potential mergers between firms though not without its critics ("Whither Merger Simulation?", 
2004). Around roughly the same time that merger simulation was being developed to analyze 
post-merger price changes, some in the antitrust community have argued that effects on non-
price attributes should be important factors considered while analyzing these potential mergers 
(Averitt and Lande 1997,2007; Lande 2001; Guiltinan 2002). Consumer choice, which in some 
cases on focuses variety, is seen as one of those vital non-price attributes (Leary 2001; Guiltinan 
2002).  Only recently has the profession explicitly considered some other variable besides price 
changes in a merger simulation. Draganska et al (2009) considered product line length along 
with price as a factor following the influential work in 2005 in which Draganska and Jain show 
that differentiated consumer product firms should optimize price and line length for profit 
maximization. Draganska et al found that along with price increases, product line length in the 
ice cream category would decrease in order to reduce substitutability between the post-merger 
firm's products and hence eliminate cannibalization among its own products.  However, their 
results are limited to only a subset (vanilla) of the highly differentiated ice cream category. 4 
 
The Carbonated Soft Drink Industry 
The carbonated soft drink (CSD) industry is an ideal candidate for the application of this 
study.  Not only is this industry highly active in terms of consolidation (e.g. see Dube, 2005 for 
an overview of merger activity in this industry) but it also provides a good example of a category 
that competes in price and variety.  To understand the importance of variety within this category 
one must consider the pricing structure that is typically observed.  The standard practice of CSD 
manufacturers is to offer several lines of merchandise where individual products within each line 
are uniformly priced.  For example, popular CSD lines include 2 liter bottles, 12 oz. cans in 12 
packs, 12 oz. cans in 24 packs, and single 20 oz. bottles usually shelved at checkout refrigerators.  
Each manufacturer will offer numerous stock keeping units (SKUs) for each line but typically 
prices each SKU within a line the same.  For example, a 2 liter bottle of Sprite is usually priced 
the same as a 2 liter bottle of Coke Classic.  Given this uniformity of pricing within a line it 
makes sense that variety or line length decisions may play a more crucial competitive role that in 
categories with non-uniform pricing.  Support for this idea can be found in Draganska and Jain 
(2005) who show that line extensions can be used in lieu of price changes as a competitive 
reaction to the price or line length changes of a rival firm.  Thus, when considering horizontal 
mergers within the CSD industry price simulations alone may not be enough to understand the 
potentially anti-competitive effects that could occur as a result of the merger.     
 
Methodology 
To facilitate the notion of “variety,” we conduct our analysis at the line-level. Well-known 
examples of food lines include products such as Yoplait Original – 6oz. yogurt, Pepsi 20oz. 
bottles, etc.  Within each line there are numerous flavors or brands that are typically priced the 5 
 
same as all other products within the line. For example, PepsiCo typically prices a 20oz. bottle of 
Diet Pepsi the same as a 20oz. bottle of Regular Pepsi. Likewise, a 2-liter bottle of Sprite is 
usually priced the same as a 2-liter bottle of Coke Classic. While consumers choose between 
flavors and/or brands within each line, it seems reasonable to assume that firms choose how 
many options are available within each line and how the entire line will be priced (Draganska & 
Jain 2005). 
In order to estimate demand, we use the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System 
(Deaton and Muelhbauer, 1980) whose use for merger simulation has ample precedent 
(Hausman, Leonard, and Zona, 1994; Werden, 1997; Capps, Church, and Love, 2003). The 
LA/AIDS model is of the form: 
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We impose adding up with these new parameters by making sure that not only do 
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  For elasticities, Green and Alston(1990) provide the below equation to compute 
uncompensated own and cross-price elasticities 
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where  ij d is the Kronecker delta equal to 1 when  j i = and 0 otherwise.  Elasticities with 
respect to line length are calculated as follows: 







e q l = +   (4) 
  The supply side is modeled under the assumption that the channel is ‘coordinated’, i.e. 
that manufacturers sell directly to end consumers.  We recognize that this assumption is 
unrealistic given the reality of how consumer packaged goods are merchandised through 
retailers.  However, this assumption is standard in the merger simulation literature and is used as 
a ‘benchmark’ starting point in our analysis.  Future versions of this study will include more 
realistic channel structures where wholesale and retail decisions will be considered in a two-
stage game theoretic framework 
    The first step is to recover marginal costs. We'll say that M is the number of competing 
manufacturers, each producing a unique set K₁,K₂,…, KM of brands. The profit function for the 
mth firm is: 
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where ck is the marginal cost of producing manufacturer m's kth brand and λ1k is the marginal 
cost of increasing the line length of manufacturer m's kth brand. Since we assume price 
competition, we obtain the following first order conditions rearranged in elasticity form: 
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where X is again the total category expenditure. We then use estimated demand elasticities, 
mean prices and mean expenditure shares to solve the first order conditions for marginal costs. 
    To simulate a merger between manufacturers m and n we let Km⋃ Kn =Kmn and the profit 
equation for the merged manufacturers is 
  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 , , , , ,
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and the corresponding first order conditions are: 
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We then assume that marginal costs, elasticities, and expenditure shares remain fixed at pre-
merger levels and solve the post-merger first-order conditions for post-merger prices and line 
lengths. 
    In order to find standard errors for percentage price change and line length, we implement 
a straightforward bootstrap procedure. First, since we have 463 observations in our data set, we 
sample with replacement 463 observations from the original data set. Second, we compute 8 
 
percentage price change and line length using the procedure described above. Finally, we repeat 
these first two steps 1000 times and calculate standard deviations for our parameters from the 
1000 observations for each respective result. We follow Capps et al (2003) in choosing 1000 
bootstraps. 
 
Data and Estimation 
The data consists of IRI chain level scanner data from two markets, Phoenix and Houston, 
made up of price and volume observations reported in ounces and line length, i.e., number of 
items within a product line for a given company. For example, the Coke 12-pack line would 
included such products as Coke Classic, Diet Coke, Coke Zero, etc. Chains included are Fiesta 
Mart, HEB, Kroger, and Randall's in Houston and Albertson's, Bashas, Fry's, and Safeway in 
Phoenix. The data is in 4 week intervals ranging from September of 2002 to July of 2007. Pofahl 
(2007) notes that this low frequency data could allow more accuracy in determining consumers' 
responsiveness to permanent price changes in the form of demand elasticities. In order to 
facilitate our study of line length, we have aggregated to the line level where lines are defined by 
the manufacturer and size of the packaging. We focus our attention on Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and 
Cadbury-Schweppes carbonated soft drinks at the 12-pack and 2 liter sizes. These combinations 
of manufacturers and sizes make up 63% of the CSD market in Houston and Phoenix. 
  Estimation of our demand model was done using Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR).  As is standard in the literature one equation was dropped from the model and the 
remaining N-1 equations were jointly estimated.  Parameters from the dropped equation were 
recovered using the theoretical restrictions discussed in the model section above.   9 
 
Quantity (oz.) Price/ounce Line Length Rev. Share
Cocacola 12p 44789157.8 0.021 21.84 0.23
(29460085) (0.003) (4.18)
Pepsico 12p 20590355.25 0.020 18.93 0.15
(22265032) (0.003) (1.98)
CadbSchwp 12p 20572198.12 0.022 18.57 0.10
(17564026) (0.004) (4.54)
Cocacola 2 liter 15502984.41 0.016 17.52 0.08
(9700298) (0.002) (2.16)
Pepsico 2 liter 8420080.372 0.016 18.11 0.07
(9692245) (0.002) (2.36)
CadbSchwp 2 liter 7076774.107 0.017 16.77 0.04
(5358450) (0.002) (1.99)
Note: Standard Errors are in parentheses
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Six CSD Lines
   
 
Results 
We use Seemingly Unrelated Regression(SUR) to estimate the model in R with the package 
systemfit. We dropped the last equation to avoid singularity and to allow us the ability to impose 
the restrictions. We tested for homogeneity and symmetry. The Wald tests rejected both 
assumptions, but we did impose them in order to conform to theory. Most of the γij estimates are 
significant with a few exceptions. Of the most interest are the line length parameters. Due to the 
quadratic nature of the line length parameters, we would expect to see θi's as positive and the λi's 
as negative, but this, for the most part, is not the case. For the 12-packs (lines 1-3), it is the exact 
opposite. For the 2-liters (lines 4-6), the line length parameters conform to our expectations, but 
none of them are significant. This is an inconvenient result which will have to be addressed in 
future research.   10 
 
Par Est T-val p-val Par Est T-val p-val
a1 1.229 10.88 0 g35 0.07 9.88 0
g11 -0.512 -20.47 0 g36 0.004 0.26 0.795
g12 0.183 9.7 0 th3 -0.004 -1.66 0.096
g13 0.033 2.12 0.034 lm3 0 2.8 0.005
g14 0.117 8.82 0 b3 0.037 8.89 0
g15 0.063 7.45 0 a4 0.459 4.51 0
g16 0.116 7.66 0 g41 0.117 8.82 0
th1 -0.005 -0.94 0.347 g42 0.004 0.28 0.779
lm1 0 1.13 0.257 g43 0.068 5.88 0
b1 -0.038 -6.94 0 g44 -0.257 -15.48 0
a2 0.903 4.09 0 g45 0.031 4.25 0
g21 0.183 9.7 0 g46 0.038 2.81 0.005
g22 -0.325 -13.37 0 th4 0.003 0.3 0.764
g23 0.181 11.66 0 lm4 0 -0.08 0.937
g24 0.004 0.28 0.779 b4 -0.024 -7.53 0
g25 -0.004 -0.57 0.57 a5 -0.085 -1.77 0.078
g26 -0.039 -2.5 0.012 g51 0.063 7.45 0
th2 -0.114 -5.49 0 g52 -0.004 -0.57 0.57
lm2 0.003 5.57 0 g53 0.07 9.88 0
b2 0.017 3.25 0.001 g54 0.031 4.25 0
a3 -0.441 -5.57 0 g55 -0.121 -16.88 0
g31 0.033 2.12 0.034 g56 -0.037 -4.43 0
g32 0.033 11.66 0 th5 0.003 0.74 0.463
g33 -0.355 -18.43 0 lm5 0 -0.28 0.779
g34 0.068 5.88 0 b5 0.003 1.7 0.09
Table 2. LA/AIDS Parameter Estimates
 
    Looking on the elasticities below, we can see that each product line is quite elastic and that 
most cross-price elasticities are positive as we would expect. Although some cross-price 
elasticities are negative, most of them are close to zero and probably not statistically different 
than zero. 
    The line length elasticities of demand are for the most part close to zero or less than one 
indicating inelasticity except for the Cadbury 2 liter elasticity. This is due to the fact that the 
Cadbury 2 liter equation was dropped in the estimation so that we could impose our constraints. 
When we estimated the unconstrained LA/AIDS this elasticity fell in line with the others. As we 
will see in the results, this elasticity could be the cause of some wild estimates that we find for 11 
 
the Cadbury 2 liter. This issue is one of the limitations of this paper and should be resolved in 
future research. 
    Marginal product costs are in line as they are all less than the prices reported above. 
Marginal costs of line length appear very low, but keep in mind that this is the cost of increasing 
line length per ounce of product produced. Pepsi 12-packs appear to be well positioned with the 
lowest marginal cost of adding an additional line. 
Coke Pepsi Cadb Coke Pepsi Cadb
Elasticity 12p 12p 12p 2l 2l 2l
Coke 12p -2.17 0.45 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.28
Pepsi 12p 1.03 -2.92 1.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.23
Cadb 12p 0.09 0.94 -2.93 0.34 0.36 0.01
Coke 2lt 1.08 0.07 0.61 -3.16 0.27 0.33
Pepsi 2lt 1.16 -0.1 1.31 0.57 -3.3 -0.72
Cadb 2lt 2.26 -0.78 0.06 0.74 -0.74 -2.6
Table 3. Uncompensated Own- and Cross-price Elasticities
 
Coke Pepsi Cadb Coke Pepsi Cadb
Elasticity 12p 12p 12p 2l 2l 2l
Line Length 0.07 0.01 0.33 0.31 0.59 2.12
Table 4. Line Length Elasticities
 
Coke Pepsi Cadb Coke Pepsi Cadb
12p 12p 12p 2lt 2lt 2lt
Product 0.01 0.0135 0.0144 0.0084 0.0114 0.0103
Line Length 0.0007 0.00004 0.0011 0.001 0.0005 0.0025
Table 5. Marginal Cost Estimates
 
We simulate three mergers: Coke-Pepsi, Coke-Cadbury Schweppes, and Cadbury 
Schweppes-Pepsi. Table 6 shows the results of our Coke-Pepsi merger. As expected from a 
merger of two companies of their respective sizes and market power, the price increases are 
substantial and statistically significant in all cases. The simulation also tells us that the merged 
Coke-Pepsi firm should increase line lengths substantially (average line length calculated from 
the data is in parentheses). All of these effects are statistically significant as well. 12 
 
Line Price Change (%) SE Line Length SE
Coke 12p 59.97 8.91 29.15(21.8) 1.03
Pepsi 12p 70.8 11.19 34.22(18.9) 2.23
Coke 2lt 28.79 9.69 21.61(17.5) 1.36
Pepsi 2lt 106.22 20.21 40.66(18.1) 3.8
Table 6. Coke/Pepsi Merger Simulation Results
 
The Coke-Cadbury merger is somewhat more problematic. As expected, we see price 
increases in 3 of 4 product lines in the merged firm (although the price changes for two of three 
of these products are statistically insignificant), but the fourth line, Cadbury Schweppes 2-liters, 
has some curious outcomes. First, the price change is highly negative and would induce a 
negative price for that product; something that clearly does not makes sense. Second, the line 
length outcome suggests a huge increase in line length even though price has decreased below 
zero according to the price change. The other three line lengths do indicate increases and are 
statistically significant. 
Line Price Change (%) SE Line Length SE
Coke 12p 78.24 45.57 30.40(21.8) 1.69
Cadbury 12p 32.46 8.44 27.25(18.6) 1.86
Coke 2lt 122.76 101.41 27.61(17.5) 2.35
Cadbury 2lt -320.83 416.8 55.05(16.8) 7.67
Table 7. Coke/Cadbury Merger Simulation Results
 
The Cadbury-Pepsi gives us clearer results than the Coke-Cadbury Schweppes merger, but 
not as clear cut as the Coke-Pepsi merger. All price changes are statistically significant and three 
out of fourth lines would increase price after the merger. The odd man out is again the Cadbury 
2-liter who would decrease price at a more reasonable level than in the Coke-Cadbury Merger. 
For the first time in any of the three mergers, one of the line lengths is not statistically significant 
(Cadbury 2-liter). The other three lines would again increase length and these changes are 
statistically significant. 13 
 
Line Price Change (%) SE Line Length SE
Cadbury 12p 55.96 14.79 31.28(18.6) 2.01
Pepsi 12p 41.65 13.45 29.77(18.9) 1.83
Cadbury 2lt -32.84 7.49 3.89(16.8) 4.12
Pepsi 2lt 39.48 16.78 30.50(18.1) 2.62




    As we expected, for the most part we saw substantial price increases for product lines after 
the merger took place due to increased market power, but unexpectedly, in every case except one 
the merged entity increased line length. Our findings could in part be explained by 
Schmalensee's (1978) research in the ready-to-eat cereal market in which he found that the 
industry used brand (line) proliferation as a deterrence to entry. Cotterill (1999) noted that cereal 
manufacturer's preferred to compete with private labels by increased market segmentation 
because this denied private labels sufficient distribution volume necessary to remain in business. 
Also in 1999, Representative Gejdenson and Senator Schumer echoed Cotterill's findings when 
they stated, "The four dominant cereal companies have successfully kept less expensive generic 
brands from attaining significant market share by "differentiating" the market (introducing new 
varieties)". Using market power to create barriers to entry may provide some explanation for our 
line length results, but these results are in direct contrast to prior findings in the literature such as 
Dranganska et al (2009) who found that line length should decrease in mergers of horizontally 
differentiated consumer product companies. 
    There remain stark limitations to this research. First, although useful, the LA/AIDS model 
is generally considered an inferior model to estimate demand as compared with, for example, a 
mixed logit model. Introducing the mixed logit or some more modern demand estimation 
procedure would be a substantial improvement of our study. Second, our assumption of Channel 14 
 
Coordination is patently unrealistic. Retailers do mark up the wholesale price so that they can 
make a profit and therefore, Manufacturer Stackelberg competition would be a more realistic 
version of supply side interaction. This follows Peters (2006) observation from his study of 
airline mergers that merger simulations are more accurate tools if more flexible models of firm 
conduct are incorporated. Flexibility is definitely not a characteristic of Channel Coordination. 
Third, even though our findings indicate large product line length increases, retailers ultimately 
decide which producers will obtain the shelf space in their stores. Although a producer may 
introduce 10 new products to a retailer, that retailer could only choose to give up the shelf space 
for a few of those products. This is an increasingly realistic scenario with the success of private 
label products in retails stores. Incorporating a model for the allocation of retail shelf space 
would greatly enhance the inherent realism and applicability of these merger simulations. In a 
related matter, Inderst and Shaffer(2007), in their study of retail mergers, found that suppliers, 
anticipating further concentration in the retail industry, will produce less differentiated products 
reducing product variety. High retail concentration, absent any future mergers, is already a 
concern in some parts of the world and may therefore have an effect on variety in some 
locations. 
    Clearly, any future research should attempt to resolve the discrepancy between our 
findings and Draganska et al(2009) by introducing more flexible demand specifications, 
Manufacturer Stackelberg competition, and a model of shelf space allocation within retail stores. 
These along with other improvements would provide a more realistic simulation and would give 
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